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An empirical study of assurance in the UK government major projects 
portfolio: from data to recommendations, to action or inaction
Abstract
Purpose:  Effective and robust governance of major projects and programmes in the public sector is 
crucial to the accountability of the state and the transparency of state spending. The theoretical 
discourse on governance, in the context of projects and programmes is not fully mature although is 
now sufficiently well developed to warrant an increased scholarly focus on practice.  In this paper, 
we contribute to the empirical literature through a study of assurance routines in the UK 
Government Major Projects Portfolio (GMPP). Design/methodology/approach: A framework 
analysis approach to the evaluation of a subset of GMPP database generates original insights into i) 
the framing of assurance review recommendations, ii) the treatment of assurance review data and 
iii) the subsequent tracking of the implementation of actions arising from the assurance review 
process. Findings: Our analysis reveals that the delivery confidence of the major projects and 
programmes included in this study improves during the time that they are assured on the GMPP. 
This would suggest that enhanced governance routines are desirable in programmes and projects 
that exhibit high degrees of complexity and scale. Originality/value: Our research findings 
contribute to the wider conversations in this journal and elsewhere on project governance routines 
and governance-as-practice in the context of government and public services.
Keywords: project governance, project assurance, review recommendations, delivery confidence 
assessment, government
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1. Introduction
Brunet (2018) suggests that project governance has gained recognition as an important object of 
inquiry, but suggests that what is actually done by different actors having to manage those 
projects has been studied much less. Brunets conceptualisation of governance as practice draws 
on a theoretical basis advanced in the International Journal of Project Managements 2014 special 
edition and includes transaction cost economics (Williamson 1998), agency theory (Eisnhardt 1989) 
and stakeholder theory (Donaldson & Preston 1995). In this paper, we structure our understanding 
of governance practices, and assurance in particular, through the literatures on project governance 
(see Müller 2009), project decision-making (see Cantarelli & Flyvbjerg 2015, Williams & Samset 
2010) and organisational learning (see Miterev et. al. 2017, Söderlund et al. 2014, Gardiner et. al. 
2018). The concept of governance has generated academic debate (see McGrath and Whitty 
(2015, 2019) and Musawir et al (2020)), we therefore accept that the definitions used in this paper 
may not necessarily reflect other conceptualistions of governance described in the literature.
The study described in this paper is situated in the major public projects arena, and our interest is 
stimulated by the authors observations on governments who have increasingly sought to use 
legislative instruments to frame their governance (or oversight) practices.  The United States (US) 
Program Management Improvement and Accountability Act (2015) is one example while in the 
UK, a three-lines-of-defence approach (HM Treasury, 2014) operates  this includes the role of a 
Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) accountable to the UK Parliament for the successful delivery of 
the project and its intended benefits. Recent inquiries by the UK Parliament Public Accounts 
Committee in 2016 and Public Administration & Constitutional Affairs Committee in 2019 further 
emphasise the important role that governance assumes in enabling SROs to navigate projects 
through the difficult challenges that complexity brings; this is often amplified by the asynchronous 
nature of policy and project delivery (see King and Crew (2013) and Kirkham (2019)).
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In this paper, we build on existing governance-as-practice literature through an empirical study of 
the UK governments database of assurance review recommendations for all major projects and 
programmes overseen by the Government Major Project Portfolio (GMPP). Assurance reviews are 
undertaken not to penalise project team actions, but to provide meaningful and practicable 
reflections on project progress. As well as to communicate to project stakeholders any insights that 
can ultimately improve the success of a given project (Bourne & Parr, 2019) rather than to ensure 
adherence to any legislative requirement. Although, assurance reviews may be mandated as part of 
the approvals or business case process, and are designed to provide support and constructive 
challenge to senior responsible owners (HM Government, 2019) Reviews are undertaken by a pool 
of independent professionals drawn from the civil service, industry and commerce.
Specifically, we investigate documented recommendations arising from assurance reviews and 
equate these with observed performance changes in the database. A content analysis of review 
reports taken from a subset of the GMPP combined with face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
with project participants to provide additional insights and context to the data forms the basis of this 
study.
The purpose of investigating the assurance recommendations is not to provide a one size fits all 
solution but rather to exploit the dense GMPP database to update the contemporary understanding 
of how project assurance activities are enacted in practice. As such the essential research question 
is: how are assurance review recommendations formulated and why are they not always 
implemented?  but by looking at this, we hope to develop a deep understanding of the practical 
dynamics surrounding assurance and review processes within contemporary government projects 
and to provide actionable guidance for practitioners on how the assurance review process could be 
improved with a view to delivering better project outcomes.
In order to achieve this, our analysis is framed by a series of questions (see Table 1) that are 
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developmental in nature and based on an incremental familiarity and understanding of the assurance 
review data set. The questions are supplemented by a researcher-facilitated workshop, undertaken 
with external assurance reviewers and designed to equip the authors with additional contextual 
understanding of the data and to prompt questions on methodological issues underlying the 
assurance review process.  In the following section we characterise the extant literature relevant to 
this study and therefore establish the basis of the research questions.
2. Literature review
2.1. Governance 
Governance, according to Samset and Volden (2016), derives from the Latin gubernar (to steer) 
and pertains to the administration of a nation or state; Fentrop (2003) asserts that the origins of 
modern corporate governance practices can be traced back to the legal and allied professions of the 
17th century Dutch Republic.  Subsequently, economists became interested in the decision-making 
processes of organizations and observed that governance theories might be helpful to organisations 
in shaping policies and procedures (Gilson, 1996). More recently, Gompers (2003) and Basu et al., 
(2007) observe that improvements in a company's governance processes may lead to increases in 
shareholder return and that independent management and greater shareholder rights can lead to 
increases in organisational performance (see Millstein & MacAvoy 1998 and Hirschey et. al. 2009).  
Conversely, weak governance mechanisms potentially lead to undesirable organisational outcomes 
including poor business performance (John & Senbet 1998) and black-swans (Taleb 2007). These 
studies have stimulated researchers to extend governance theories to other sectors, organisations 
and academic disciplines such as healthcare, justice, education and the legislature (Too & Weaver, 
2014). In this context, we understand governance as the means by which, organizational goals are 
achieved through policies, processes, and structures in the realm of projects (Müller, 2016). The 
recognition of projects/programmes as instruments of organisational strategy delivery has led to a 
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growing acknowledgement of the requirement for good project governance (Biesenthal & Wilden, 
2014)  the benefits being a framework for decision-making that is logical, robust and aligned with 
other corporate activities incluing risk management and compliance.  Whilst the literature on project 
governance is generally positioned as a subset of the corporate governance literature (see, e.g. 
Müller, 2009), the focus of project front-end governance research is generally quite sparse (see 
Williams et. al 2019a). 
2.2 Governance and governmentality
Governmentality provides a useful lens to view governance practices. The concept of 
Governmentality, this is, the behaviour or actions designed to influence, direct, or affect the conduct 
of people was first introduced by Michel Foucault in his Security, Territory, Population lectures. 
Li (2007) describes Foucaults theory as the conduct of conduct whilst Müller et. al. (2016) 
develops this notion, in the context of projects, to reflect human (soft) aspects of project 
governance in contrast to hard methodologies that underpin governance routines, commenting that 
while governance provides a particular project mana ement methodology in an organization, it is 
governmentality that regulates how the use of this methodology is enforced. Müller considers 
governmentality to be the "mentalities, rationalities, and ways of interaction, chosen by the 
governance roles to implement, maintain, and change the governance structure" 
Biesenthal and Wilden (2014) suggest that the development of studies in the project field is 
inextricably linked to organisational and corporate governance research. Turner and Simister (2000) 
argue that the theories of corporate governance can be rationally transferred to the practice of 
project and programme delivery; Miller & Hobbs (2005) and Crawford & Helm (2009) argue that 
project governance involving multiple companies is, in effect, a contract organisation. Sanderson 
(2012) presents an analysis of risks and uncertainties in an organization through governance 
theories; Müller et al. (2013) focus on governance methods in a project team, and their relationship 
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with ethics and trust. Weill and Ross (2004) discuss how to conduct a governance procedure for a 
particular department. The relationship between project governance and project success is also well 
developed in the literature: Müller and Martinsuo (2015) discuss the relationship between project 
owners and their suppliers; their conclusion that project governance promotes effective 
communication talks to the wider literature on the importance of collaboration, trust and ethics in 
project organisations. Wang and Chen (2006) analyse the impact of project governance mechanisms 
in the IT industry. Yazici (2009) shows that the cultural background of an organization will also 
affect the success of the project. Where a projects participants hold common interests and values, 
the likelihood of project success will increase.
In contrast, Clases et al. (2003) emphasise the consequences of over-control in situations where 
the environment facing the organisation changes, and unreasonable response mechanisms emerge 
that lead to agency tendencies (see 2.3). Project governance research also generally seeks to 
emphasise the importance of good governance structures and governance processes (Peterson et al., 
2002). Whilst particular researchers believe accountability to be one of the main driving forces 
behind of project governance,  overtly controlling methods in an organization may increase 
resistance in agency tendencies towards accountability, resulting in effects at significant variance to 
those initially desired (Knodel, 2004). Complex governance systems may lead to decision inertia 
(Keyes-Pearce, 2002) and a tendency towards overty risk averse behaviours.
Whilst the literature describes the importance of sound governance mechanisms and their possible 
impact on projects/programmes (Müller et al. 2016; Aliza et al. 2011; Müller & Lecoeuvre 2014), 
the application of these systems in the organisational setting may not necessarily lead to 
performance improvements (Peterson et al., 2002). The enacted governance model may exhibit 
conflicts in practice so the co-ordination of the resolution of conflicts is a key dynamic capability.
In conventional democratic systems, good governance of major public programmes and projects is 
a key component within a broader framework of accountability and transparency of public 
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spending; consequently, project-studies scholars have increasingly turned their attention to 
theoretical and practical aspects of governance, considering how decisions arising from governance 
and assurance routines may influence short-run and long-run benefits (and disbenefits) and the 
tension between policy formulation and implementation through projects/programmes and 
operational delivery.
Crawford & Helm (2009) argue that effective governance frameworks could unlock potential 
improvements in performance and better attain desired outcomes while offering traceability, 
transparency, and accountability. The implication is that learning, and the creation of new insights 
into performance, is a product of governance practices. 
There are clearly defined governance procedures (Klakegg et al., 2009), influenced by the 
emergence of New Public Management since the 1980s. Indeed, these are particulalry well 
articulated in the UK (e.g., HMT & Cabinet Office, 2011). In this paper, we consider a governance 
framework as an organised structure established as authoritative within the institution, comprising 
processes and rules established to ensure projects meet their purpose (Klakegg et al., 2009, p. 60), 
which Klakegg et al base on previous literature such as Miller and Hobbs (2005). 
2.3 Governance and agency problems in the context of major projects and 
programmes
While a number of theoretical lenses such as stakeholder theory and customer relationship 
management theory (Zwikael et al., 2015) have been usefully applied to the study of major projects 
and programmes, the units of analysis within this research naturally lean towards the explanatory 
power of agency theory. Renz (2007) describes agency theory as essentially concerned with the 
contractual relationship between the provider of projects resources and the user of those resources 
(Hannafey et al., 2013); the owner of project resources is usually identified as the principal whilst 
the manager responsible for using and controlling these resources is identified as the agent (Turner 
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et al., 2003). Therefore, when examining assurance reviews and their recommendations, there is a 
naturally defined agent (manager) and a naturally defined principal (owner). Agency theory 
provides a necessary theoretical lens to help us understand and interpret these key interactions in the 
context of the projectified environment. Develoiping this agency theoretic view, Zumbansen (2007) 
suggests that the separation of ownership and control is a common organisational form in modern 
organisations and in projects specifically because project investors often lack the specific relevant 
expertise needed for project delivery and transition to operations.
The corollary is that delivery teams may require more information than the principal, the project 
sponsor, and this information asymmetry may adversely affect the principal's effective oversight of 
whether the agent serves the principal's interests appropriately (Chang, 2014). Specifically, project 
owners and project managers represent different interests and in this case, it is possible that a moral 
hazard or conflict of interest may occur. Mahaney and Lederer, (2011) claimed that if the agency 
dilemma is neglected or not effectively dealt with through good project governance, undesirable 
risk and uncertainty may increase and thus delivery confidence may decrease. 
Whilst agency theory is closely related to the concept of accountability (see Jensen, 2000), Trkman 
(2010) emphasise contracts and contractual responsibility as instruments to resolving agency 
problems; emphasising the advantage of different principal-agent relationships in project 
environments. Zwikael et al., (2015), in a more turbulent project environment, suggests that project 
sponsors should strengthen the control of project governance to reduce the negative impact of risk 
and uncertainty.
2.4 Learning arising from governance practices in projects and programmes
Grabher (2004) proposes the notion of a project ecology as a means by which to conceptualise 
the essential processes of creating and sedimenting knowledge at the interface between projects 
and the agents and networks in and through which projects operate. Gardiner et. al (2018) propose 
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the strategy-project system as an alternative conceptualisation, that emphasises the crucial role of 
projects in organisational learning and strategy delivery; this work promulgates the dynamic 
capability of learning ability and agility (seel also Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 2009), arising 
from the interaction of tacit accumulation of experience (Goffin et al., 2010), knowledge 
articulation, and knowledge codification. Hartmann and Dorée (2015) consider learning to be a 
contextually embedded social activity, using the theory of social learning, so learning is not copy 
& paste but a translation and reinvention activity to enact knowledge in a new context. 
Organisational learning is also concerned with how projects deal (or intend to deal) with unexpected 
events (Makridakis et. al 2019). Christianson et al. (2009) demonstrate how learning from rare 
events changed organisational routines at four sites of learning, suggesting project failure might be 
seen as a consequence of the failure of an organisation to learn.
Projects are often perceived as unique and learning from failure rarely happens due to 
organisational boundaries (Baumard & Starbuck, 2005). Learning from success also falls victim to 
survivor bias, whereby pitfalls are often overlooked as the sample examined did not experience 
these pitfalls. However, project learning through project reviews is one form of learning where 
organisations have learned from samples of one. This depth reflection provides opportunities to 
examine outcomes that were potentially possible in that cause of the project but were not eventually 
realised, thus avoiding the problem of survivor bias.  Williams (2008) shows it is unclear whether 
current practices achieve their aims for learning, identifying factors which inhibit learning, 
including lack of resources and top-management support, but also cultural (e.g., blame-culture), the 
temporary organisation nature, and project complexity. The literature on lessons-learned is 
pervasive yet this remains a major challenge to enact in large, complex organisations; Anbari et al. 
(2008) stresses the importance of post-project reviews/after action reviews in helping future project 
teams plan for success, yet recognises that the PMBOK defines lessons learned narrowly  
pertaining mainly to the closeout phase (p. 13). 
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Gardiner et. al. (2018) emphasise many of the learning challenges that project/programmes 
experience through the lens of the strategy-project system such as cultural, physical and political 
influences. 
Later in this paper we explore the role of project reviews in triggering improvement actions, and 
how learning from implementation of recommendations may (or may not) occur. The change that 
reviews effect can be viewed through the lens of learning for the project itself (stage/phase/gate 
reviews) or other projects (ex-post reviews). 
Ajmal & Koskinen (2008) underline the importance of preparing the organisation to foster a culture 
that facilitates and encourages knowledge creation, sharing, and utilisation. One knowledge-broker 
could be the Project Management Office (PMO) (Williams, 2008), but Pemsel & Wiewiora (2013) 
find that PMO functions are not always fully aligned with project managers knowledge-sharing 
behaviour. 
Aerts et al. (2017) suggest that public organisations (and their actors) learn from and share working 
experience (in the context of large-scale infrastructure projects). Of note was the transfer of (public 
sector) project teams from one project to another to allow project learning to be disseminated and 
knowledge transferred from the individual to the permanent organisation. Nevertheless these 
projects, perhaps particularly so for public-private partnership projects, were considered weak 
regarding organisational learning.  We have considered project governance and how to learn from 
project to project (El-Tigani et. al, 2019). But often implementing that learning does not seem to 
actually happen  commonly known as the knowing-doing gap, we consider this literature in 
Section 2.5.
2.5 Implementing recommendations and the knowing-doing gap
Pfeffer and Sutton (2000)s knowing-doing gap is well known, concentrating on let[ting] talk 
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substitute for action. They consider over-reliance on past custom and practice, and problems of 
fear, mistrust and internal competition and ways to minimise these (in context of project studies, see 
Styhre et al., 2004; Williams, 2008). They note the importance of closing the loop; and point to 
measures and measurement process as major barriers to turning knowledge into action, concluding 
with eight guidelines for action. 
This idea has been taken up as part of the discourse within management (e.g., Zheltoukhova, 2014; 
Baldwin et al., 2011), particularly why people and organisations do not learn from events and 
successes/failures. Levinthal and March (1993) describe failure myopia, Any learning process 
tends to [seek to] eliminate failures  learning produces confidence and confidence produces 
favourable anticipations (p. 110), but balanced by Madsen and Desai (2010), who claim we 
learn better from failures than from successes. However, some scholars observed little learning 
from failures (Edmondson, 2011; Baumard & Starbuck, 2005).  Downham and Lingham (2009), 
looking at national enquiries, say although investigations are often mandatorily conducted following 
serious incidents, nowhere is there any focus on the process by which recommendations arising 
from such investigations should be followed through to implementation (p. 58). 
3 The coalescence of these considerations 
The theoretical literature on governance, organisational learning weakness, inherent principal-agent 
problems and the knowledge-doing gap suggests that empirical studies into the practice of 
assurance regimes may offer an original opportunity to interrogate the dynamics of how 
government projects learn from past experience and how these agency problems are manifesting.   
Thus, in this study we focus on the UK Governments Major Projects Portfolio (GMPP) and, inter-
alia, seek to understand the scale and scope of the gap between knowing and doing. 
The GMPP represents the most complex and strategically significant projects and programmes in 
the UK (IPA 2017b, p. 1); it is overseen by officials in the UK Infrastructure and Project Authority 





























































International Journal of M
anaging Projects in Business
12
(IPA) (hereinafter referred to as the authority).  The work of the authority includes the annual 
oversight of > 200 independent assurance reviews using the Office of Government Commerce 
(OGC) GatewayTM process methodology.  Gateway reviews (see Fig. 1) are episodic and occur at 
critical decision points in the project life cycle, known as Gateways 0 to 5: start-up (or strategic 
assessment); business justification; delivery strategy; investment decision; readiness for service; and 
operation review / benefits evaluation (IPA, 2017a). Gateway Review 0 scrutinises at the program 
level and is repeatable; Gateway Reviews 1-5 are conducted at the project level (IPA, 2017a). 
Reviews are usually commissioned by Senior Responsible Owners (SROs), as part of a wider 
approach to reflection on project delivery. 
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Fig 1: OGC Gateway Review Process
In addition to Gateway reviews, UK major projects and programmes are subject to other types of 
assurance such as Project Validation Reviews (PVR) and (maybe) Project Assessment Reviews 
(PAR). A PVR (formerly Starting Gate Review - SGR) is conducted during the early stage of a 
project, often before the SRO is appointed, to explore project initiation (IPA, 2017a). A PAR is 
usually carried out instead of one of Gates 0 to 5 if bespoke terms of reference (ToR's) are required 
and can be repeatable throughout the project lifecycle (IPA, 2017a). For further information, see 
IPA (2017a, pp. 5-10) and HM Treasury (2016, p. 24).
The benefits of the authoritys reviews include insights generated by the independent perspective 
and the reflective nature of the conversations with the Senior Responsible Owner (SRO) and 
project/programme team. Reviewers form a temporary team for 3-4 days. At the review end, a brief 
report of evidence-based findings and recommendations is produced for the SRO, awarding projects 
with a non-negotiable delivery confidence assessment (DCA) using a five-point rating: Green 
(Successful delivery of the project  appears highly likely), Amber-Green, Amber, Amber-Red, 
or Red (Successful delivery of the project appears to be unachievable) (IPA, 2012, p. 11). The 
report is discussed with the SRO and forwarded to the IPA; with proposed remedial actions agreed 
before the review team departs. 
The UK National Audit Office (NAO) (NAO 2016) identifies some variability in responses to 
assurance review recommendations and suggests that the authority was unable to establish any 
causality between recommendations and improvements in project performance. The OGC (using a 
method approved and audited by the NAO) claimed the process had saved the taxpayer over £2.5 
billion by 2007 as a result of more than 1,500 Gateway reviews (HMT, 2007); the validity of this is 
questioned in Xu et al. (2011). 
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The project owner (the principal) delegates their project accountability to a project sponsor who 
is responsible for the realisation of project outcomes and monitoring the behaviour of the project 
manager (the agent). The project sponsors of UK major projects/programmes  the SROs - use 
assurance reviews facilitated by the authority to address the issues caused by the separation of 
project ownership and control (Ahola et al., 2014, p. 1330). The UKs 34-year-old Osmotherly 
Rules were revised in 2014 to mandate accountability of the SRO to Parliament and be expected 
to explain the decisions and actions they have taken during the period they are responsible for 
delivery of their project (Riddell, 2014). The corollary is that the SRO takes ownership of 
assurance review findings and ensures that appropriate action is taken to address recommendations 
in the advised time-scale (IPA, 2016b, p. 2).
Project review is a term with various definitions in practice and in the literature. Here, the term will 
be used to refer to assurance activities that scrutinise projects in order to assess what happened and 
why and to decide appropriate actions to enhance the results of following activities. Reviews might 
look at resources (people, money, and time), performance (outputs achieved) and/or readiness (for 
the near future). Project reviews can take place at any time during a project life cycle. Various types 
of project review have been mentioned in, e.g., APM BOK (APM, 2012), PMBOK (PMI, 2013), 
and PRINCE2 (OGC, 2009). Oakes (2008) categorises project review by frequency, degree of 
formality, degree of independence, attributes being reviewed, and review style (pp. 34-39). 
Different review types typically come together in harmony over a projects lifecycle and provide a 
system for lessons learned and sharing, thus potentially improving project knowledge and 
performance (Kotnour & Vergopia, 2005). Different governments have different ways of 
categorising project reviews (Klakegg et al., 2010), with UK processes described below.
Much of the literature on project review considers stage-gate approaches, conducted at critical 
points during the project lifecycle. Key decisions are based on decision makers comprehension of 
the project; however, the quality of decisions is regularly questioned. Bowman et al. (2015) 
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summarise failures of UK public projects as either projects undeliverable from the start or projects 
insufficiently governed; reviews aim to halt the former and correct the latter. Many governments 
have developed formal stage gate review approaches (Nalewaik & Mills, 2014). 
The outcome of a gate review is textual information in the format of recommendations. Xu et al. 
(2012) show efforts made by Governments to develop methodologies to quantify review outcomes 
but without much success. They suggest that a gateway review could generate the most significant 
impact on the project outcomes during the business justification phase and least during the benefits 
realisation phase. Although they solely analysed Australian projects, this introduced some ideas for 
quantifying the value of gateway reviews.
Aside from SROs, other key actors are the authoritys Strategic Delivery Advisors (SDAs).The 
SDA acts as the principal point of contact between the authority and a Government Department 
(Appendix 1), usually at the interface with the Departmental Portfolio Office (DPO) (or equivalent) 
and the GMPP projects/programme. The SDA initiates planning for a review, determines the skills 
and experience required in the review team, agrees ToR with key stakeholders, and recruits and 
briefs the review team. The review team is empowered with responsibility for the review, but with 
support from the SDA available throughout. The final report prepared for the SRO will form part of 
the evidence base for day-to-day engagement with the SDA going forward to provide continuity. 
(see Annex 1 and 2 for visualisations of the assurance regime and the wider context of Treasury 
approvals processes for major government projects ). 
4 Research Methodology
The aim of this study is to increase our knowledge and understanding of assurance routines in UK 
government major projects and programmes; specifically we seek to evidence how action (or 
inaction) may arise from the recommendations that arise. We define a framework, similar to that 
described in Volden (2019), of seven framework research questions (FQs) with associated sub-
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questions, addressing the findings of the literature review.  The questions are situated in a broader 
framework of analysis that seeks to enact a methodological approach capable of i) sourcing a 
disparate data set comprising quantitative and qualitative data, ii) managing sensitive data in 
accordance with strict and exacting requirements and iii) contextualising the data to understand the 
nuances that may affect the researchers understanding and interpretation. We propose a modified 
version of Framework Analysis (see Gale et al 2013; Srivastava & Thomson, 2009), with the 
intention of generating a deeper and nuanced set of insights into the data available to the 
researchers. Framework analysis is agnostic of the epistemological and theoretical lens adopted by 
the researchers, and can be used with a range of qualitative methods (Gale et al 2013 in Hackett 
2018). In this paper, we enact a six-step approach (see Figure 2): 
(a) Theoretical structuring, governance processes and data familiarisation. An extensive 
literature review provided researchers with a theoretical basis to enact a semi-structured 
interview instrument, for use in establishing the current desideratum of the assurance review 
processes and data capture. The researchers interviewed an assurance review coordinator and 
thirteen external (to the government) assurance reviewers at a workshop (Workshop 
attendees), we were able to establish an impression of the issues facing assurance reviewers, 
and derive premises for the first interview protocol and later analysis.
(b) Pilot analysis. Drawing on data from seven review reports of a GMPP project to develop and 
test the planned data-inspection, analysis, and interview protocol. The project was chosen based 
on the project director (PD)s willingness in providing access to project materials.
(c) First-cut quantitative analysis of the authoritys assurance database (AD): An analysis was 
carried out in 2018 to understand the data, and identify key constructs. Some transparency data 
on the performance of the GMPP is made available annually and consolidated into the 
governments annual report on major projects. In parallel, the authority also actively monitors 
and update an internal assurance database; however, this is not publicly available as a data-
base; to do so would undermine the whole integrity of the assurance system and foster a 
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greater sense of risk aversion (Meggs, 2018).
(d) Assurance review data qualitative analysis framework: to generate deeper insights into the 
data set, the researchers identified seven central themes, and a twenty-five further sub-questions 
emerged from (a)-(c) as shown in Table 1.
(e) Detailed qualitative analysis. A qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) of 
assurance review reports from five GMPP projects (per Table 2) was undertaken, using the sub-
questions in Table 1 as a coding scheme. Three of four types of GMPP projects (see below) 
were included; more transformation projects were investigated as they made up nearly half of 
the database (see below). Selection criteria included: the project had recently left GMPP, had 
existed on GMPP for at least two years, had DCA ratings not exclusively green/amber-green 
while on GMPP, and was not subject to data access restrictions (so military projects were not 
studied). The names of the projects/programmes selected are confidential.
(f) Deep-dive analysis: Following the detailed analysis, two GMPP projects (Project 1 and 2, with 
improving and worsening DCA rating respectively) were investigated using semi-structured 
interviews to address the research questions listed in Table 1. We recruited eight participants 
based on their willingness to be interviewed: for Project 1 (only), we were able to interview the 
projects IPA Strategic Delivery Advisor (SDA) and one of its SROs; for Project 2 (only), we 
were able to talk to the projects IPA SDA and two of its Programme Directors, of whom one 
was the projects SRO for a brief period of time; and we were also able to gain further 
information from our IPA assurance coordinator, another IPA SDA, and one departmental 
portfolio officer (who gave information regarding the relationship between the projects, 
assurance reviews, the IPA, and the departments). Many reviewers were outsourced, and it 
was, therefore, difficult to secure their participation. The interviews lasted between 30 and 60 
minutes; notes were agreed with the interviewees and analysed using the same approach 
described in (e). An overview of the interview details can be found in table 3.
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5.1.1 Change in Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) of projects over the time spent 
on GMPP
On average, Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) ratings improved over time; a DCA rating of 
amber/amber-red at first review tended to steadily improve during the projects life on GMPP. 
Typically, eight reviews occurred prior to a green DCA. This is likley to reflect the uncertainty that 
characterises the initial stages of a project (Samset & Volden, 2016), in that its is more likely that 
projects will be assigned amber/amber-red (or even red) on entry to the GMPP. Overall, the 
prognosis for successful delivery improves during the period that a project remains on the GMPP.
5.1.2 Recommendations degree of urgency 
The recommendations are divided into three different levels subject to their urgency: critical (do 
now), essential (do by), or recommended (should benefit from following this recommendation). 
43% of recommendations were marked essential (medium urgency), with the proportions of 
critical (most urgent) and recommended (least urgent) roughly equal. One interviewee 
suggested that reviewers might become involved in projects too late, so critical issues have 
mostly happened. That raised the question of whether RDU varied with the change of the reviews 
DCA ratings (whether a Red review had a greater proportion of critical recommendations than 
a Green review). Analysis indicated that the proportion of essential recommendations tended to 
fluctuate around 40% irrespective of DCA ratings; however, the proportion of critical 
recommendations was noticeably different by DCA ratings, being 46%, 37%, 31%, 22%, and 4% 
for reviews rated red down to green, respectively. This perhaps explains why projects tended to 
take recommendations more seriously when the review was rated red or amber/red (Fig 3).
Trend analysis shows that RDU tended to decrease gradually as projects progress from review to 
review whilst on GMPP. On average, projects first review on GMPP had RDU around essential, 
RDU then declined slowly and reached midway between essential and recommended after 
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approximately eight reviews. Average RDU was more likely to fall moderately as a consequence of 
being included within the GMPP, reducing the issues identified as needing immediate action. The 
rate of decline was different for different project categories, and IC projects (alone) (which on 
average started with fewer urgent recommendations) saw an increase in RDU over time. Although 
MC projects began their first review with more critical recommendations, their decline toward 
less urgent recommendations occurred faster; MC project selection and review processes are 
different, perhaps explaining why RDU decreased more during the project lifecycle.
5.1.3 Distribution of recommendations by their primary and sub-categories
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a consistently critical concern for reviewers. 
A typically high proportion of recommendations in certain classifications led to some speculation 
amongst workshop attendees that there was a sense that commonly used categories may cognitively 
associate with reviewers in general because they feel more confident in identifying issues related to 
particular primary categories or sub-categories. 
5.1.4 Continuity of issues addressed 
We examined changes in the pattern of recommendations during the duration of the project whilst 
on the GMPP. We assigned a value of one where a particular recommendation was in the same 
category in consecutive reviews and a value of zero where a particular recommendation did not 
have the same category in consecutive reviews. The average (i.e., correlation between the main 
issues raised in one review and the next) was 0.46, so some common concerns recur; this might 
appear high, however each primary category is divided into sub-categories  thus having the same 
primary category does not necessarily imply recommendations address precisely the same issues. In 
some instances the recommendations move into a sub category may indicate the recommendation 
has been broadly addressed previously but remains relevant from a changed perspective. 
5.1.5 Continuity of Senior Responsible Owners (SROs)
Senior Responsble Owners (SROs) rarely deliver a project from cradle to grave; in our analysis 
some 5% of GMPP projects had a single SRO responsible for the project over a 4-year period; the 
NAO notes that some 56% of projects have experienced at least 2 changes in SRO (NAO, 2016 p. 
36). Our analysis reveals a 50% chance of continuity of SRO in post between one review and the 
next. Pettigrew (2008) suggests that continuity of leadership is an absolutely critical factor i  the 
performance of an organisation over time. However, our research also suggests that changes in 
SROs might not necessarily be problematic. Revisions to the Osmotherly Rules require an 
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enhanced level of seniority of SRO appointees. The limited pool of sufficiently senior SROs may 
increase the likelihood of individuals leading multiple projects. Other reasons for SRO turnover 
included resetting a project, changes to ministerial leadership, and changes in required civil 
service competencies. It is nevertheless desirable to monitor the effect of changes in project 
leadership (see Parker and Skitmore 2003).
5.1.6 Qualitative analysis of assurance review recommendations using textual analysis
We analysed the narrative text of recommendations to identify common themes using a simple 
NVivo frequency query. The term plan is quoted frequently, consistent with the findings of the 
assurance database analysis, showing the sub-category project planning as the most common 
category of issues identified.
5.2 Findings from the analysis of assurance reviews and interviews with 
reviewers. 
In this section we present the results from the content analysis of assurance review reports gleaned 
from the five selected UK major projects and programmes (activity e) and from the deep-dive 
analysis into two of those projects, (activity f). The findings are presented thematically, and in line 
with the set of framework research questions identified in Table 1. 
5.2.1 A tailored approach to defining the scope of the review is preferred
Whilst the scope of project validation review (PVR) and gate reviews was tailored, standard terms 
of reference are used. However, the definition of the review scope - and the role of SROs in scope 
design - could not be evidenced. The majority of interviewees indicated that review scope was 
agreed by the strategic delivery adviser (SDA) and the SRO/project team before the review, and that 
the SRO could request that particular idiosyncratic issues be brought into scope. Assessment and 
planning meetings usually enabled review scope to be defined to suit the requirements of the SRO, 
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however this was not always the case. In Project 2, we observed (unusually) that the predefined 
scope of most of the reviews of left little in terms of flexibility, hence the SRO had little chance to 
shape the review; we also recorded evidence that the PVR was set up at significant pace and that 
recommendations were made with insufficient testing of policies, leading to challenges later. Some 
workshop attendees felt assurance reports should be disseminated beyond the SRO, possibly within 
the authority and hence suggested improved interaction between the wider authority and the review 
team.
5.2.2 The pre-defined scope did not restrict the exploration of issues during the review
Review reports show that most recommendations focused on addressing the pre-agreed review 
scope. However, the research indicated that the pre-defined review scope seemed not to restrict the 
issues that could be addressed: rather than recommendations always addressing known issues, the 
team could amend the scope during the reviews. Most interviewees said review scope could be 
amended to accommodate emergent issues and it was impossible to know all issues before the 
review start. However, the review scope of Project 2, which was imposed on that projects reviews, 
did not always address what were felt to be its most critical issues. Interviewees indicated the 
usefulness of having skilled people on the review team, who could ask the types of questions that 
ensured the review focused on the significant issues.
5.2.3 Reviews were generally pre-planned, not all were commissioned by the SRO
Most reviews were pre-planned, with some reviews slightly delayed or advanced from baseline 
milestones. The only exception was one project brought to an early closure due to changes in 
departmental objectives, so two previous assurance reviews were not pre-scheduled but triggered by 
the closure proposal; it was unclear how the project team viewed the recommendations in those two 
reviews since we were not provided with an implementation update. We also found that not all 
reviews were commissioned by SROs; it is perhaps worthwhile to consider whether different types 
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of review commissioners led to a variation in the level of implementation of recommendations.
SDAs stressed that review outcomes needed to be beneficial to both the IPA and the SRO, so it is 
crucial that the SRO is involved in pre-defining the review scope. That was typically done during 
the assessment and planning meetings where the scope could be influenced (although as in FQ1.1 
and FQ1.2, the SRO (for one unusual project) did not always have an opportunity to thus 
participate, leading to adverse effects on the receipt of recommendations  (Ref: FQ5.1).
5.2.4 The effect of SRO turnover on the implementation of recommendations was not clear.
All five projects exhibited high SRO turnover, but the effect varied. There was no evidence that 
implementation of recommendations or the DCA decreased due to SRO change. Participants 
suggested that reducing SRO turnover was a priority, but that the change in SRO was not 
necessarily an indication of a problem (see 5.1.5). SRO turnover appeared to produce negative 
effects (e.g. the difficulty of the SRO adapting to the new environment, and understanding the 
continuity of that environment, or a potential shift in priorities.) but also positive effects, including 
new SROs presenting a fresh perspective on the project, or the decision of the right person at the 
right time to ensure project success. SRO turnover might not always reflect reality, e.g. one SRO 
interviewed had to step down to PD and was replaced by the Executive Director due to the new 
Osmotherly rules (see above), so the nominal change in SRO made little difference to the project. 
5.2.5 Continuity of reviewers is perceived to be important, but specific expertise in the project 
less so
The sample of reviews illustrates that c.50% of reviews featured at least one review team member 
(RTM) from the previous review(s). Our analysis suggests that the benefits of the continuity of 
reviewers are inconclusive. All interviewees suggested that there should not be continuity of the 
whole review team, but that it may be beneficial to retain at least one reviewer. A mixture of 
reviewers was suggested, comprised of some with experience of the project and others with 





























































International Journal of M
anaging Projects in Business
27
expertise from other domains. The authority aimed to maintain the continuity of at least one 
reviewer; but this was dependent upon availability.
Whether reviewers looked only within their expertise could be investigated by comparing the 
expertises of each RTM with issues addressed in their reviews, but this information was not 
available. The SRO of Project 1 (a successful project) thought the reviewers were excellent in that 
they looked at all the project-related issues, no matter what kinds of expertise they had. Some 
Workshop attendees raised a question about the degree of training received by external reviewers; 
although the assurance process for Gates 0-5 was well understood, additional training and 
explanation on the other types of assurance (e.g. Critical Friend Review) could be usefully given to 
reviewers.  Review team leaders had the opportunity to give negative feedback on unproductive 
RTMs during peer assessments, but it was suggested that they often avoided doing so in practice.. 
5.2.6 Project reports and interviews suggested that most recommendations made were based 
on both reviewing project documents and interviewing relevant people.  
Generally, review teams were well informed before carrying out a review; project documentation 
usually provided the team with groundwork pointing to key issues to be covered. Interviewees 
stated that one-to-one interviews were vital; correlation crosschecks between documents and 
speaking with key project stakeholders helped reveal outstanding issues needing further 
investigation. Reviewers often formed views after reading documents, but many issues only came 
out from interviews, which might change initial perceptions. 
Some Workshop attendees felt it was easy to get overwhelmed by the immense amount of 
information given, and it was hard to judge which documentation to read in a short timescale. This 
view was reinforced by an SROs comment in one review report about the review team having 
insufficient time to read and absorb all the evidence presented. 
Many early warning signs are of a less measurable nature and thus depend on more gut feeling 
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approaches (Williams et al., 2012, p. 46). Although we could not find any evidence about 
reviewers using soft indicators whilst they were undertaking project review interviews, some 
Workshop attendees noted that gut feeling and experience helped them direct interview questions, 
and suggested a range of soft indicators, which they might use during an interview to help detect 
the extent to which an interview was misleading (e.g., recalcitrance, inconsistency of 
message/answer, and parrot fashion answers). We found these bad signs not prominent in either 
review reports or interviews with key informants. We also did not find any commentary by the 
reviewers in their review reports on the conduct of the reviews. For the one unusual project, it was 
believed that the reviews only tried to handle emerging delivery issues instead of concentrating on 
addressing the main issues of policy assumptions. 
5.2.7 Only a minority of interviewees expressed concerns over the insufficiency of time 
allocated to reviews
Typically, the authoritys assurance review was restricted to a 2-4 day period. Review reports did 
not indicate reviewers complaining about time issues, except for one SRO who suggested that the 
IPA should consider lessons from one review as the short time available for the Team had led to 
significant rework of the report for factual accuracy; however, this was felt not to be typical. One 
interviewee suggested that it might be beneficial for complex projects to have a review over four 
days in order to include a larger number of interviews and leave enough time to write the report. 
5.2.8 Recommendations focused mostly on delivery rather than benefits, with over 70% of 
recommendations addressing delivery issues
Literature on project success divides this concept into delivery success and benefits success. 
PVR and Project Closure Reviews had a slightly higher percentage of recommendations focusing 
on benefits, perhaps implying a skewed emphasis on benefits towards project initiation (to get 
projects started) and closure (to get projects signed off). This finding agrees with a more general 
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finding in the PMI Project Benefits study (Williams et al., 2019b). Interviewees commented that 
recommendations were much more linked to what was directly needed to get to the next stage of the 
project cycle, rather than project benefits. Chipulu et al. (2018) show that when asked about project 
success, people tend to talk about effectiveness (benefits) criteria, but when talking about project 
failure, they talk about efficiency (delivery) criteria. However, we found no signs of the balance 
between recommendations focused on project delivery and those focused on benefits varying with 
DCA (e.g., reviewers concentrating on delivery if DCA was red, and benefits when DCA is green).
5.2.9 Review reports confirmed that most recommendations were aimed at the SRO and the 
project/program level, but some were aimed higher. 
While recommendations were generally directed toward the SROs or the project teams, others were 
messages for higher levels such as Permanent Secretaries. For example, Project 1s SRO believed 
that although most review recommendations for his project were aimed at the SROs, a minority 
were targeted above the project to convince the Minister or the Department to take actions. 
Workshop attendees from phase (a) indicated that giving too many or combined recommendations 
might inhibit recommendations being implemented. We found that only 8% of recommendations 
made for the five selected projects were combined ones and that most combined recommendations 
tended to originate from the same review teams. For the selected projects, the number of 
recommendations made in each review report ranged widely, from three t  26; only 11% of the 
review reports had over ten recommendations, whilst over half had 7-10 recommendations. Thus 
given the continuity between recommendation type and review team, it seems the intended recipient 
of a recommendation may vary in accordance with who conducted the review rather than for a 
systematic rationale.
5.2.10 Review reports show that few SROs gave comments on the reviews; amongst those who 
did, most were positive
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 It was unclear whether these comments had real meaning or were only a formal complimentary 
gesture.  In only two cases that were observed did SRO give negative comments, including (i) the 
review team did not focus on addressing the pre-agreed primary issues and tended to explore other 
areas, and (ii) recommendations were ambiguous or made based on hearsay rather than material 
evidence. Here, the lack of buy-in from SROs was evident. It was interesting that these SROs 
disagreed with the review findings while, theoretically, they were the customers and probably 
commissioners of the review; this raises questions about the general role of the SRO in the 
assurance process. Some Workshop attendees felt there was pressure to include in the report 
recommendations that the SRO specifically wanted to see, e.g., a need for additional resources. 
They also noted that some SROs could become defensive when presented with negative findings or 
a worsening DCA.
A review recommendation cannot compel action; rather it directs the SRO towards action that will 
support improved delivery. It is therefore at the SROs discretions as to weather to enact these 
recomendations Project 1s SRO thought the effect of this depended on for whom the reviews were 
intended. The interviewee, as an SRO, was satisfied with the current policy in which a reviews 
DCA rating was not negotiable, whereas recommendations might be discussed before finalisation of 
the review report. S/he said recommendations should be made for the SRO and should be seen as a 
means to support the SRO; if recommendations were considered made for the Department, there 
would be a danger of recommendations being manipulated and might not get buy-in from the SRO 
and project team. It was evident from review reports and interviews that if the SROs were not 
convinced of a recommendation, s/he would discuss it with the review team to clarify the situation 
rather than implement it.  Although an assurance review is not an audit and should only be seen as 
complementary to other internal assurance activities, there was still a strong opinion amongst most 
interviewees that the IPA assurance process should provide a valid picture of the project for the 
SRO as part of the control mechanism. It would be worth looking further whether and for how long 
recommendations remained appropriate or valid after a review. As projects progress, 
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recommendations objectives might no longer be appropriate.
5.2.11 There was no evidence to suggest that a blame-culture featured in the review process
 Blame-culture (Brown and Jones, 1998) is commonly observed and perceived in project-oriented 
settings, Williams (2008) observes this specifically in a UK Government setting. However, matters 
related to blame culture were not noticeable in either review reports or interviews. In Project 2 
there were discussions between parties on how the project was undertkane in a theoretically effcive 
manner,, but the project did not achieve its desired outcomes; however, the interviewees did not 
consider those discussions as a blame game, instead as an attempt to seek the lessons learned for 
continuous improvement.
5.2.12 The reasons why review recommendations were not implemented is unclear
Workshop attendees expressed a variety of opinions and observation on possible causes of 
suggested recommendations having not been implemented. Whilst we observed a few 
recommendations that were unpersuasive (Ref: FQ5.1-5.2), we could not find any evidence of other 
causes. Project 1s SRO said s/he always encouraged candour and frank discussion throughout the 
review. The two PDs of Project 2 pointed out an occasion when the review was not considered as 
helpful; in that particular case, the interviewees agreed that the reviewers did not explore the real 
problems facing the project (although raised to them by the project team).
If a project receives a red/amber-red DCA following a review, an Assurance of Action Plan 
(AAP) review ought to be undertaken to to check whether actions taken since the previous review 
have significantly improved the likelihood of successful delivery (IPA, 2016a, p. 3). However, the 
review reports studied show that not all such reviews were followed by an AAP. One SDA 
indicated a lack of resource to carry out reviews was one reason. 
Interviewees indicated that, as far as they knew, recommendations from current and previous 
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reviews were tracked by the Programme Management Office (PMO) and/or DPO (or equivalent), 
where applicable (see Figure 1). We suggest that the DPO could be the catalyst for enabling 
organisational learning from projects (see Gardiner et al., 2018). It was indicated that DPOs had 
existed since 2000; by 2010 Departments with a DPO were still the minority, but all were aiming to 
have one. DPOs provide assurance and report to their Departmental Boards on their portfolio and 
are linked to the authority, with reporting on GMPP schemes and overall transformation progress. 
5.2.13 Our analysis emphasises a high correlation between the primary categories of 
recommendations from one review and those in the following review
The desire to respond to over-bureaucratic assurance control in the public sector causes staff to 
tick boxes, whether this compliance is for real or merely legitimating activity (Arnaboldi & 
Steccolini, 2015, p. 6). Although most interviewees suggested that assurance review 
recommendations were implemented earnestly, review reports show some recommendations, 
already marked as completed or done recurring in subsequent reviews. The data analysis also 
emphasises a high correlation between the primary categories of recommendations from one review 
and those in the following review. It would be worth looking further into whether the repetition of 
recommendations is a sign that some recommendations were just done as a box-ticking exercise to 
progress to its next stage (see the literature on the knowing-doing gap), or were due to changes in 
project circumstance that made the involved issues arise again. One interviewee said sometimes 
repeated recommendations were made to reinforce work that had already been done.
Most workshop attendees noted they had observed some assurance review recommendations not 
being implemented for reasons detailed in FQ5.4. Two of Project 2 review reports showed that 
some recommendations were not acted on as the SRO remained unconvinced of their 
appropriateness. One interviewee believed that non-implemented recommendations were 
uncommon, but when they did occur the main reason was a lack of senior leadership or buy-in 
(i.e. the SRO did not have sufficient authority in the organisation to get such recommendations 
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implemented or believed that the recommendation was inappropriate).
5.2.14 Interviewees acknowledged that there was almost no follow-up on recommendations by 
the reviewers and that there was little sanction for not implementing recommendations
A review team was only responsible for checking actions that resulted from recommendations made 
in a preceding review. All other recommendations (i.e. outstanding recommendations and 
recommendations made for the final review) were monitored by the PMO and the DPO or its 
equivalent. Figure 1 illustrates, in principle, how recommendations are tracked and reported. NAO 
(2010) suggested incorporating continuous assurance, having assurance reviewers working 
alongside project teams in its system, at least for most high-risk projects; however, NAO (2012) 
shows that the IPA did not consider it had the resources to conduct continuous assurance and thus 
did not implement this suggestion.
5.2.15 The delivery confidence rating might not automatically improve despite the 
implementation of all recommendations.
Changes in the project/programme environment may lead to declining currency of review 
recommendations, or recommendations in themselves not having the desired impact. NAO (2016, p. 
7) states that the authority has not yet established a link between assurance review 
recommendations and project performance and departments responses to assurance 
recommendations are varied. The authority now requests SROs to complete a Review Feedback 
Form to indicate their view of the review (IPA, 2016b). However, this practice is optional, and as 
reviewers are entitled to see this feedback, it is not clear whether SROs will necessarily voice 
criticism.
Our analysis shows very few SROs gave feedback directly in review reports. Where they did, most 
feedback concerned the helpfulness and usefulness of the reviews, either by offering advice or 
reinforcing work already being done. Nearly all interviewees agreed that the reviews provided the 
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SRO with insight and meaningful recommendations. Project 1s SRO was positive about the 
outcomes of assurance reviews and felt Project 1 would have been less successful if the reviews had 
not been conducted and recommendations not been made. In contrast, the two PDs of Project 2 
thought its assurance review recommendations only concentrated on project delivery and were 
irrelevant to the main issues facing the project (underlying policy) and the realisation of intended 
benefits; that projects situation did not improve despite the project team implementing most of the 
recommendations; they thus did not think the reviews were of value for the SROs and felt the 
assurance system restricted the reviews value (i.e., limiting the way people think from imposing a 
pre-determined structure - Hodgsons (2002) Foucaldian analysis). Finally, interviewees thought the 
assurance processes was not updated to reflect what was taught in the governmental courses for 
senior project leaders; a general view amongst interviewees seemed to be that the process was about 
how to progress to the next stage instead of trying to understand the projects real operating 
environment.
Project 1s SRO noted differences in opinions on whether it was the DCA or the implementation of 
recommendations that made the difference to a project's further progress. For Project 1, when the 
DCA was Amber-Green, the senior management probably did not take recommendations as 
seriously as when the DCA was Amber-Red; if the DCA rating was Red/Amber-Red, 
recommendations would have a higher likelihood of being executed to move the project forward. It 
is therefore both the ratings and the recommendations that make a difference.
6 Discussion and conclusions
The findings from this study, and the learning that has occurred, may be viewed through the lens of 
Ostroms (1990) mainstream rational thought perspectives. These outline eight principles of 
managing common goods: 
 scope and boundaries of the common (in this context, who can conduct what projects - e.g., 
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digital transformation programmes should include the UK Governments Digital Service);
 appropriation and provision (the legitimacy arising from authoritative Treasury guidelines);
 collective-choice processes for appropriation of the common (a rational process of project 
appraisal applied by the Treasury); 
 effective monitoring and control of resource consumption; 
 a scale of sanctions for violators of resource use rules (this would include Departmental 
Spending Limits (DSLs), Parliamentary Select Committees); 
 mechanisms of co flict resolution (judicial review, public enquiries); 
 self-determination recognised by a higher authority (perhaps not currently); 
 multiple layers of nested governance. 
The gateway process is one of a number of means of covering all eight of these issues, and the 
principles show that the appraisal and follow-up of recommendations from such reviews form an 
important governance structure to prevent departments or indeed individual projects simply doing 
what they want. An agency theory lens provides a theoretical basis to explain how the government 
manages its interrelations in the context of major projects and programmes and why the assurance 
process is necessary.  There are a number of important concluding remarks that can be drawn from 
this study.
 
The delivery confidence of the projects included in this study generally improves over the period 
of time spent on the GMPP, but it is not possible to generalise this conclusion to the wider 
population of projects and programmes. We also observed that 50% of assurance review 
recommendations were assigned a medium level of urgency; but it is not clear whether reviews are 
executed at the most strate. The proportion of recommendations at the highest level of urgency 
decreased as a projects DCA rating improved. RDU usually decreased over time (except with IC 
projects), perhaps because project issues needing immediate action reduced while projects were 
within the GMPP system (receiving the authoritys support). Military projects began with many 
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more most-urgent recommendations. Continuity of recommendations between reviews: The 
correlation between recommendations from one review and those in the next (regarding primary 
categories of issues) was almost 0.5, which seems quite high.  Commissioning a review: Not all 
reviews were commissioned by the SROs, e.g., a PAR can be commissioned either by the SRO, the 
authority or the chair of HM Treasurys Major Projects Review Group.  The review scope: Each 
reviews scope was pre-agreed (assessing standard ToR as a minimum). Scope could generally be 
defined to suit the SRO. Most recommendations addressed specific concerns agreed within the 
scope, but the scope could be amended to accommodate emergent critical issues. Most reviews were 
pre-timed, with some reviews slightly delayed or advanced from baseline.
Effect of SRO turnover: There was only a 50% chance of continuity of SROs in post on projects. 
However, the impact of SRO turnover was unclear. There was no evidence that implementation or 
DCA was related to a change in SRO. SRO turnover was not necessarily an indication that 
something was wrong- it results in both positive and negative effects. Discontinuity in project 
leadership, its causes and impacts need to be better understood.
Review teams and members: Half of the reviews had no review team member from the previous 
review. It appeared difficult to maintain continuity of RTMs/leaders due to availability. It seemed 
there should not be continuity of the whole review team, but beneficial to have continuity of at least 
one RTM and to have a combination of reviewers who had knowledge of the project and those who 
could bring expertise related to the project stage/type of review. Reviewers looked at all issues and 
were not limited to their areas of expertise. However, external reviewers appeared sometimes to 
have insufficient training. Review team leaders might be reluctant to give negative feedback on 
RTMs to maintain good relationships, despite having the opportunity to do so.
The formulation of assurance review recommendations: Most respondents felt that in general 
there was enough time to carry out the review, with a few exceptions on very complex 
projects/programs; it might be beneficial for these to have reviews over four days or more. Most 
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recommendations were made after both reviewing documentation and interviews, but sometimes 
reviewers needed to review a large amount of information in a short timescale.
Issues addressed by assurance review recommendations: Recommendations focused more on 
delivery (70%) than benefits. PVRs (or SGRs) and Project Closure Reviews focussed on benefits 
slightly more often, implying more emphasis on benefits during project initiation and closure. 
Recommendations were typically more linked to what was directly needed to get to the next stage 
of the project than to addressing project benefits. Issues relating to the achievement of 
benefits/strategic fit should be continuously assessed in all types of reviews. Our analysis shows no 
indication that reviewers paid more attention to benefits when DCA was green and to delivery when 
DCA was red. 
Number of recommendations per review. This ranged from 3-26; 11% had more than ten; the 
number should perhaps be limited to more critical issues. Combinations of issues were covered 
within 8% of recommendations - each issue should be addressed in a separate recommendation.
Behavioural dynamics of reviews:  Very few SROs gave comments on reviews. Of those who did, 
most were positive. It was unclear whether comments had real meaning. SROs are now asked to 
complete a feedback form after each review. This is still new and optional, so the impact of this on 
assurance is unclear. Reviewers are entitled to see feedback, so SROs may be inhibited in 
commenting.
In some cases SROs gave negative comments on reviews, even though they were the review 
customers and probably commissioners; here lack of SRO buy-in with recommendations was 
evident. Recommendations should be seen as intended to help SROs. Reviewers should ensure 
recommendations are convincing, unambiguous, well written and understandable. Perhaps review 
DCA rating should be non-negotiable but recommendations debatable.
We did not detect signs of a blame game, but rather a debate of how or why such projects could 
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not achieve their desired outcomes despite best endeavours. Perhaps this debate should be 
encouraged in a more transparent (to the public), as a means by which the sharing of lessons learned 
can be improved.  Project reviews are one specific way to socialise learning from previous projects.
Implementation of recommendations: The analysis suggests that the DCA rating influences the 
propensity to implement review recommendations (or not): amber-green DCAs are, for example, 
unlikely to attract little enthusiasm to take forward, in contrast to red-amber DCAs. We note that 
AAP reviews should be undertaken for high-risk projects receiving a poor DCA, but this did not 
necessarily happen.  We also observed inconsistencies in tracking (follow-up) of implementation of 
recommendations. DPOs (where they exist) could play leading role in tracking implementation, 
which not all currently do; and there could be a common mandate regarding the formation of a DPO 
and their role. 
Contribution to the literature
This paper presents a first ever indepdent research investigation into assurance review data 
contained in the UK Governments Major Project Portfolio.  The results generated from this study 
provide insights into the value of enhanced governance for complex projects and programmes and 
furthermore, the broader issues associated with the accountability and responsibility of those 
changed with their leadership.  The research also provides additional contributions to the literature 
on benefits realisation management in the sense that evidence arising from the study illustrates that 
recommendations (in assurance reviews) tend to focus typically on (project) delivery rather than 
long-run benefits, this complements the wider literature, which suggests that project success (and 
the realisation of benefits) may be seen as secondary to project performance in the context of 
governance routines.
Further research
The data analysis suggests that it may be appropriate to assess if different project selection and 
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review processes in defence influenced the observed reduction in recommended degree of 
urgency, and conversely, why the level for infrastructure & construction projects tended to worsen 
(slightly) over their project cycles.  This could be achieved through establishing a control group of 
projects to be reviewed earlier than currently recommended to compare the level of urgency of 
resulting review recommendations.
Uncovering the reasons for repeated recommendations (see 5.2.13) may offer improved insights 
into the challenges of organisational learning; a deep dive into a sample of recommendations that 
are repeated in subsequent reviews may offer some useful answers.  We also suggest looking further 
into whether recommendations are taken more seriously if reviews are called ad-hoc rather than pre-
timed.
Clarifying whether different types of review commissioners lead to a different level of 
recommendation implementation and studying antecedents and consequences of SRO turnover, 
specifically the apparent correlation between SRO tenure & changes, and stability/ improvement in 
DCA ratings.  Finally, we suggest a detailed examination of the correlation between the focus of 
recommendations (on benefits or on delivery) and the reviews DCA ratings.
Limitations of the study
The main weakness of this study was the paucity of projects studied and participants interviewed 
due to restricted data access. Therefore, the findings are not generalizable beyond the subset of 
projects that were examined. The data-base covered all types of project, but the two cases only 
covered two of the four GMPP categories (infrastructure and transformation). There is also a 
methodological weakness in the research, in that the cases are regarded as post-case-studies, while 
trying to contribute to the governance-as-practice literature, which would be better studied by 
contemporaneous detailed studies. However, the study, however, to the best knowledge of the 
authors, is the first to provide unique insights into the assurance of UK major projects and 
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programmes through a systematic analysis of assurance review recommendations. The results of 
this study suggest a number of further avenues for research including benchmarking improvements 
in confidence ratings for GMPP projects with other public sector projects delivered by government 
departments and arms-length bodies.
In conclusion, there are a number of practical recommendations that arise from this study, The 
findings suggest several courses of action that may lead to potential improvements in the approach 
to the design and implementation of the assurance review processes described in this research, as 
outlined in Table 4.
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Table 1. Assurance review data analysis framework
Analysis framework questions (FQs)
Analysis framework questions from
(a) Pilot study
(b) First cut analysis of governassurance 
review data
(c) Interviewing Workshop Attendees
(d) Interviewing project delivery 
professionals
1. The review scope
1.1. How is the assurance review scope defined? (a)
1.2. How does the definition of scope affect the reviews 
usefulness?
(a)
1.3. Are the reviews pre-planned? Would recommendations be 
taken more seriously if the reviews were called ad-hoc?
(b)
1.4. What is the significance of the SROs defining the scope? (b)
1.5. What is the effect of SRO turnover? (b)
2. Review Teams 
2.1. Is having consistency (or non-consistency) of review team 
leaders/members good or bad regarding the effect on 
Assurance review recommendations?
(b)
2.2. Is there evidence of reviewers only looking within their 
expertise?
(a)
3. How are recommendations made?
3.1. Are recommendation derived mainly from interview or 
documents? How good is the quality of documents 
provided to the reviewers?
(b)
3.2. What is the effect of the SROs oversight in planning the 
reviews?
(a)
3.3. Whether there were any bad signs (such as recalcitrance, 
the inconsistency of message/answer, parrot fashion 
answers, etc.) during the reviews as pointed out by 
Workshop attendees?
(c)
3.4. Whether enough time was given to the reviewers to do the 
reviews?
(c)
4. What do recommendations cover?
4.1. Are recommendations concentrating on project benefits or 
operational delivery? Does the type of review make a 
difference here?
(b)
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4.2. At what level of authority (i.e., project, SRO, 
departmental, ministerial, etc.) are recommendations 
aimed?
(b)
4.3. How often were there too many or combined 
recommendations?
(c)
5. Receipt of recommendations
5.1. What influences comments by the SROs? Can we detect 
lack of buy-in from the SROs, and why?
(a) and (c)
5.2. What is the effect of the implementation of review 
recommendations not being mandated? Should 
recommendations be mandated anyway? What are the 
implications of the SRO being responsible for 
implementation?
(b)
5.3. Is there any evidence of the influence of a blame culture 
when the project goes wrong? What is the effect of the 
various parties incentives on the review process?
(b)
5.4. Any evidence of issues raised by workshop attendees?
- Reviewers as outsiders who could not understand 
the project well.
- Reviews as organisational bureaucracy.
- Unconvincing recommendations.
- Bandwidth, capability, or understanding issues.
- Badly written recommendations.
- Subsequent/separate commercial decisions (by the 
Department and/or externally) rendered the 
recommendations not fit for purpose. 
(c)
6. Implementation of recommendations
6.1. When do Assurance Action Plans (AAPs) happen and 
why?
(b)
6.2. If there are not AAPs, how do projects record the progress 
of implementing recommendations in their systems?
(b)
6.3. What evidence is there that recommendations were taken 
to heart or just done as a tick box exercise?
(b)
6.4. Why were some recommendations not implemented? (c)
6.5. Do we see evidence of a lack of follow-up on 
recommendations?
(c)
7. Effect of recommendations
7.1. Where recommendations are followed, why does delivery 
confidence not always get better? Do the reviews do any 
good?
(b)





























































International Journal of M
anaging Projects in Business
43
7.2. Did the reviews delivery confidence rating or the 
implementation of recommendations make the difference? 
If there was only the delivery confidences colour but no 
recommendations, would that have any effects on the 
subsequent project performance?
(d)
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Table 2. Selected projects for detailed analysis
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Table 4. Recommendations arising from the research. 
Theme Recommendation 
1. Roles and 
responsibilities
1.1 Ensure the input of the Senior Responsible Owner in the 
definition of assurance reviews terms of reference.
1.2 Consider responsibility for following up implementation
1.3 Consider mandating a departmental portfolio officer role, 
which can ensure that AAP reviews are conducted for all high-
risk projects receiving an Amber-Red/Red DCA rating
2. Assurance 
review teams
2.1 Explore the potential for appropriate but not excessive 
continuity of review team membership
2.2 Ensure that external reviewer training remains accessible and 
available




3.1 Develop guidelines for the project team and the relevant 
department to aid in optimal selection of materials for the 
review team
3.2 Develop guidelines to ensure that benefits receive as much 
attention as delivery, in the light of evidence that desired 
benefits are likely to be delivered only if they are managed 
throughout the project lifecycle.
3.3 Guidelines should suggest concentrating recommendations on 
a manageable number of the most critical issues and 
discourage the coalescence of different issues within a single 
recommendation.
3.4 Guidelines should distinguish those parts of the review that are 
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open to discussion from those that are non-negotiable once the 
review team has completed its review.
4. Continuous 
improvement
4.1 Continually review and improve the lessons learned process, 
encouraging the widest possible involvement. Learning from 




5.1 Undertake a reflection on the efficacy of the Review 
Feedback Forms
5.2 Compare the effect of the process for defence projects 
compared to other GMPP categories
5.3 Look into the reasons for repeated recommendations
5.4 Consider the effect of SRO turnover.
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Appendix 1:  The responsibility of the organisations which are parts of the assurance process for GMPP projects
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